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EDITORIALS
JUDICIAL ABUSE OF HABEAS CORPUS
In March, 1929, in the ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW." there appeared
comment upon the action of Judge Charles A. Williams of the
Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, in releasing from a peni-
tentiary on a writ of habeas corpus a man who had pleaded guilty
to a charge of murder. There seemed to be as little judicial excuse
for that action as one could well imagine.
1. 23 IilaNois LAw REVmw 695.
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It now appears that a greater imagination was needed. The
same Judge Williams was persuaded to release on a writ of habeas
corpus Emil Schneider, who had been convicted of an assault with
intent to commit rape. Perhaps a man of that type at large is less
to be feared than a murderer. But the person released in this in-
stance was convicted in Du Page County. His attorney,2 who ap-
peared for Joseph Chapman in the earlier case, was no more suc-
cessful in preventing the Supreme Court of Illinois from quashing
the record made by Judge Williams in the second case3 than he
was in the first case.4
There was no real merit in the reasons assigned for releasing
Chapman, but they had some plausibility. The reasons assigned
for requesting a release of Schneider, who had been in the peni-
tentiary at Joliet for two and one-half years, are positively puerile.
Here they are: (1) While the indictment charged that Schneider
made an assault with intent forcibly to ravish, yet the charge was
void because it failed to allege that the female was under sixteen
years of age. (2) The jury committed a fatal error when it re-
turned a verdict that found Schneider guilty of an "assault with
intent to rape"; it should have returned a verdict of guilty of an
assault with an intent to commit rape. (3) The trial court was
without jurisdiction to impose sentence in a penitentiary because
Schneider was under twenty-one; he should have been sentenced to
the reformatory at Pontiac. (4) Schneider was charged with rape
as well as an assault with intent to com'mit rape. Under the Parole
Act the jury is to fix the term of imprisonment upon a conviction
where one is "charged" with rape. In the particular instance, the
jury merely found him guilty as charged and that he was "about the
age of twenty-one years." Upon this verdict, the trial court sen-
tenced him "for a term of not less than one year nor more than
fourteen years." 5 The point was, apparently, that because he had
been "charged" with rape, the fact that he had been convicted of
only an assault with intent to commit rape should have been ignored
and he should have been treated as if he had been convicted of rape.6
2. W. G. Anderson. The classified telephone directory for Chicago has
under the title of "Lawyers" only one W. G. Anderson.
3. People ex rel v. Williams (1929) 334 Ill. 241, 165 N. E. 693.
4. PeoPle ex rel v. Williams (1928) 330 Ill. 150, 161 N. E. 312.
5. The record facts set forth were obtained from a copy of the brief
and argument filed in the Supreme Court of Illinois by Mr. C. W. Reed,
State's Attorney for Du Page County. Acknowledgment is made of his
kindness. The "brief and argument' contains a copy of the common law
record in the case of People v. Schneider.
6. If he had been convicted of rape, it may be conceded that the jury
should have fixed the term of imprisonment. The conviction of an assault
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The Supreme Court of Illinois had no apparent difficulty with
any of these allegations.7  Most of them seem only to jest with the
administration of criminal justice. If that were not a matter of
importance, the whole proceeding could be passed over as one of
life's little jokes. But if one should think that the allegations set
forth are matters of any moment, surely he will admit that the
propei procedure would have been to have sued out a writ of error.
This was never done, and it was available to Emil Schneider. There
seems to be no excuse for the attempt to use habeas corpus as a
substitute for a writ of error.
This case illustrates how an ancient writ can be abused; how it
is possible to present the application to one judge and then another
until a favorable judge is found.8  Under an elective system of
judges without any satisfactory concentration of judicial authority,
the public welfare in particular questions is at the mercy of the
with intent to commit rape was equivalent to an acquittal of the counts
charging rape.
7. The first suggestion ignored the fundamental difference between rape
without consent and statutory rape; the second is the sort of nonsense that
only American lawyers, apparently, can argue without smiling; the third
merely involves a statutory provision which would seem to be beyond a
perverse intellect to misinterpret; the fourth was based on the proposition
that a charge of rape is equivalent to a conviction of rape despite the fact
that the jury returned a verdict of an assault with intent to commit rape.
There is nothing to show which of these suggestions, or whether all of
them, appealed to Judge Williams.
8. "After the conviction, and imprisonment of Schneider, efforts were
made in his behalf to obtain his release on parole, but were unavailing, the
parole board for some reason or other being unwilling to parole him. Later,
his attorney informed me that he was about to apply to Judge Lindsay, then
Chief Justice of the Criminal Court of Cook County, for a writ of habeas
corpus. I informed him that I did not believe it was legal, or that Judge
Lindsay had jurisdiction. He laid the matter before Judge Lindsay, and
the judge apparently agreed with me that he had no jurisdiction, for he did
not issue the writ, and I doubt if the petition for habeas corpus was even
actually filed. No doubt the judge told his attorney before the filing of the
writ, that he was of the opinion that he was without jurisdiction, and the
filing of the petition would not avail him anything.
"Later, other counsel appeared as representing this defendant, and
the petition for the writ was filed before Judge Williams. I appeared,
and opposed the same, but the writ was issued, and the defendant brought
'into court." Reed, C. W., Letter of May 9, 1929, to writer.
See People v. McCarthy (N. Y., 1929) 165 N. E. 810. The Code of
-Criminal Procedure in New York provides for an appeal to the Court of
Appeals if a judge thereof, or a justice of the appellate division of the de-
partment where the conviction was had, issues the proper certificate. This
provision is interpreted as follows:
"Only one such application can be made. It may be made to any judge
of the appellate division or to any judge of the Court of Appeals. The ap-
plication is to the judge personally, not to the court. The judge must hear
the application, if made to him. When, however, he has heard and denied the
application, it is final: application cannot be made to any other judge either
of the appellate division or of the Court of Appeals. If this were not so,
it would be possible for the application to be made to all of the judges
of these courts in succession." (Italics supplied.)
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least capable judge. If possible, the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus should be placed under restraint by proper legislation.9
Furthermore, emphasis should be placed on the fact that Judge
Williams released a man who had not been convicted in Cook
County. Recently there has been a newspaper article stating that
Judge T. N. Greene in Peoria upon application filed by Victor
Michel had released from the Joliet penitentiary two individuals
who had been convicted in Cook County.10 All of this is just one
more item of evidence that the administration of criminal law in the
State of Illinois is archaic and even disgraceful to the civilization of
which some Americans like to boast.
KENNETH C. SEARS.
9. "From my experience in this case, and from a perusal of other cases
cited in my brief, it seems to me that some legislation should be passed where-
by the writ of habeas corpus should be limited in cases of prisoners held
in penal institutions, to the courts from the venue of which prisoner was
convicted. In other words, it would appear outrageous if a certain judge
sitting in Cairo, Illinois, should assume the power of issuing writs of habeas
corpus to review the convictions of criminals sent to the Joliet penitentiary
from the Criminal Court of Cook County." Reed, C. W., letter of May 9,
1929, to writer.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the case under review holds that the
Superior Court of Cook County had no "jurisdiction" to issue the writ if
the Circuit Court of Du Page County had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the person of Schneider. See also, Goodnmn v. Dalv (1929) 165 N. E.
906.-
But most any defect can be said to be jurisdictional and apparently some
judges cannot distinguish even roughly between jurisdictional and non-juris-
dictional facts. Perhaps there is no dividing line between them that is always
obvious. We seem to need legislation (assuming its constitutionality) that
will prevent so far as possible courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction from inter-
fering with each other under circumstances similar to those in the case under
review. Such conflicts are not conducive to the proper administration ofjustice.
In People v. Zimmer (1911) 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529, Mr. Justice Hand
wrote: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ and when
properly issued supersedes all other writs, and by reason of that fact it
should be confined to its legitimate office, otherwise an ignorant, reckless,
or partisan judge, by usurpation, may through the writ work a great wrong
to society and the state by discharging offenders who have been lawfully
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by other courts while legally exer-
cising co-ordinate jurisdiction with the court granting such discharge."
10. Chicago Daily Tribune, Friday, September 13, 1929. For further
information concerning this release on habeas corpus, see the Chicago Daily
Tribune for October 25 and 26 (news item and editorial).
